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Refusing to Settle: A Look at the Attorney‘s Ethical 
Dilemma in Client Settlement Decisions 
Jane Y. Kim  
ABSTRACT 
Imagine you are a solo practitioner and have taken on a new 
personal injury case. Your client, the plaintiff, is adamant about 
going to trial. You initially think she has a good chance at a hefty 
award, but as the case progresses you realize her potential recovery 
is much lower than expected. You strongly recommend settlement as 
her best possible option to obtain some meaningful payment, but she 
persistently refuses to settle. What do you do? Your options are either 
to withdraw from the case or to continue with representation, despite 
your disagreement with the client. In some instances, however, the 
court will take away your option to withdraw and mandate your 
continuing representation.  
Both avenues can potentially create serious ethical questions. The 
American Bar Association (ABA) and state model ethics rules 
provide that it is the client who ultimately decides whether or not to 
settle.
1
 Why, then, are attorneys allowed to withdraw in some cases 
because their client refuses to settle? What effect does withdrawal 
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 1. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2010), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_
conduct/rule_1_2_scope_of_representation_allocation_of_authority_between_client_lawyer.ht
ml; see, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT, R. 1.2, narrative comment 1.2:320, available at 
http://www.law.cornell .edu/ethics/il/narr/IL_NARR_1_02.HTM#1.2:300 (2011). 
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have on a client‟s unfettered right to determine the objectives of the 
representation?
2
  
On the other hand, continuing representation raises legitimate 
concerns of whether the attorney can effectively represent a client 
with whom he or she has a fundamental disagreement. What can the 
attorney do in this case? What should the attorney do? 
INTRODUCTION 
Jokes and real criticism about lawyers and the legal profession‘s 
perceived lack of ethics are common.
3
 Indeed, some lay people may 
be surprised to learn that ethical rules of conduct play an important 
part in regulating the legal profession, and lawyers facing tough 
decisions in their daily practice of law
4
 often turn to these guidelines, 
and the judicial interpretations of these guidelines, for answers.
5
 One 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. See generally Peter Tiersma, Lawyer Jokes: Truth and Nonsense about the Legal 
Profession, LANGUAGEANDLAW.ORG, http://www.languageandlaw.org/JOKES.HTM (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2011) (discussing the various categories of jokes pertaining to lawyers); see 
also John M. Barkett, From Canons to Cannon, in A CENTURY OF LEGAL ETHICS, TRIAL 
LAWYERS AND THE ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 173 (Lawrence J. Fox et al. eds., 
2009) (describing a survey conducted in 1986 that found that ―[o]nly 6 percent of these 
[corporate users of legal services] rated ‗all or most lawyers as deserving to be called 
‗professionals,‘‖ and that ―68 percent said that professionalism had decreased over time, while 
55 percent of state and federal judges, who were similarly surveyed, said that professionalism 
was declining.‖). 
 4. See Carla Messikomer, Ambivalence, Contradiction, and Ambiguity: The Everyday 
Ethics of Defense Litigators, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 740–41 (1998) (noting, in her study of 
defense attorneys, that ―[a]t the most general level, the rhetoric of judges and lawyers revealed a 
tension, if not an outright division, in their interpretation of the mission of the American legal 
system . . . . This motif—ambiguity, contradiction, and ambivalence—was a recurrant [sic] 
theme throughout the rhetoric of the lawyers and judges . . . .‖); see also Lucian T. Pera, Guide 
to Resources and Materials on Professional Responsibility Issues, 23 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 
589, 589 (1993) (―Every lawyer, whether business lawyer or trial lawyer, must resolve ethical 
and professional responsibility issues on a daily basis.‖). 
 5. Professor Peter Joy states that: 
 There are at least four important spheres of lawyer self-governance regulating the 
conduct of lawyers. First, there are ethics rules adopted by each jurisdiction, usually 
based on the American Bar Association . . . Model Rules of Professional Conduct . . . . 
Second, there is enforcement of ethics rules through state disciplinary processes. 
Third, there are court proceedings relying on ethics rules for enforcing clients‘ rights 
against lawyers in motions to disqualify or professional malpractice actions. Fourth, 
there are ethics opinions in which a bar association committee, bar association counsel, 
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scenario in which attorneys may seek guidance is when they find 
themselves representing a client who refuses to listen to the 
attorney‘s advice.6 According to the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct,
7
 the attorney is directed to abide by the client‘s 
decisions about the objectives of their representation, and the rules 
specifically leave settlement decisions solely to the client.
8
 However, 
what if the attorney reasonably and strongly believes that the client‘s 
case would not withstand trial? If the attorney continues, or is forced 
 
office of disciplinary counsel, or some other entity interprets the rules and provides 
guidance to lawyers seeking to comply with prevailing ethical rules.  
Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of 
Lawyers‟ Conduct, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 316–17 (2002). 
 6. See Brian Sullivan, Canning Your Client: You Have A Pretty Good Idea When Enough 
is Enough. But How Can You Limit the Fallout When You Give A Client the Boot?, A.B.A. J., 
46 (Mar. 2008) (describing several real-life situations in which difficult clients were 
encountered and offering advice on how to limit exposure to these difficult clients); see also 
Abbe Smith, The Lawyer‟s “Conscience” and the Limits of Persuasion, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
479, 495 (2007) (offering several methods of cajoling a client to follow the attorney‘s advice, 
which she explicitly states does not include threatening to withdraw, lying, or representing to 
the client that the attorney‘s efforts will be less than zealous); Thomas L. Browne, What 
Lawyers Should Do When the Clients Dig in Their Heels, CHICAGO LAWYER, Oct. 1994, at 11 
(offering advice for such situations); Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering 
Client, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 331 (1987) (discussing the moral roles of the attorney and the 
client in response to Professor Thomas Shaffer).  
 7. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT (2010), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/
model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.html [hereinafter ABA MODEL 
RULES]. 
 8. See Sylvia Stevens, Bar Counsel: What Can You Do?: When A Client Repudiates a 
Settlement, OR. ST. B. BULL. May 2008, at 9, available at http://www.osbar.org/publications/ 
bulletin/08may/barcounsel.html. Stevens argues that a ―lawyer does not have a ‗fundamental 
disagreement‘ with a client merely because the client refuses to follow the lawyer‘s advice or 
chooses a course the lawyer believes is unwise, particularly where the decision (settlement) is 
one that is squarely within the client‘s sole control.‖ Id. at 10. Stevens recognizes the difficulty 
a lawyer may have when representing a client who refuses to settle: 
Although we generally recognize that the client has sole authority over whether to 
settle, the client‘s refusal is more than a repudiation of the offer. It is also a repudiation 
of our professional advice, our stock-in-trade and the very thing the client ostensibly 
hired us for. The more personally involved we are in giving the advice, the more likely 
we will be to take offense at the client‘s decision and view it as a breakdown in the 
relationship. 
Id. at 12. However, Stevens ultimately seems to brush by this difficulty and merely 
recommends that the attorney ―can avoid some of the angst of the situation by endeavoring not 
to take the client‘s repudiation personally, and by reminding ourselves that our obligation is to 
do the client‟s bidding and pursue the client‘s interests.‖ Id. 
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to continue by the courts, then he or she runs the risk of violating 
other ethical codes of conduct, namely, the role of the lawyer as an 
officer of the court,
9
 the possibility of ineffective representation,
10
 
and the established bar against meritless claims, among others.
11  
One of the ABA‘s main goals is to improve the legal profession 
through the promotion of ―competence, ethical conduct and 
professionalism.‖12 It has served this goal through the promulgation 
 
 9. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT pmbl. (2010), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_
conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_scope.html. 
 10. See Smith, supra note 6, at 491 (―So-called client-centered lawyers can do damage to 
their clients by ‗simply acquiescing‘ to their foolish wishes.‖).  
 11. See The Comm. on Prof‘l Responsibility, The Ass‘n of the Bar of N.Y.C., The 
Evolving Lawyer-Client Relationship and its Effect on the Lawyer‟s Professional Obligations, 
51 REC. ASS‘N B. CITY N.Y. 443 (1996). This report discusses the changing nature of the 
attorney-client relationship, namely through greater client involvement and decision in the 
―scope, cost, objectives and means‖ of representation, which may ―conflict with the lawyer‘s 
professional obligations, under the New York Code of Professional Responsibility, to provide 
competent and zealous representation.‖ Id. at 444; see also Edward O. Lear, Going Through 
Withdrawal, L.A. LAW., Oct. 1998, at 38.  
 [S]everal rules and statutes exist to ensure that withdrawing attorneys—even those 
who are fired—do not abrogate their legal and ethical obligation to protect their 
clients‘ interests. An improper withdrawal could result in State Bar disciplinary action 
as well as malpractice consequences, so attorneys must proceed with caution. 
Id.; Nathan M. Crystal, Ethics Watch: “Let‟s Make A Deal”—Settlement Ethics, S.C. LAWYER, 
Nov. 2008, at 8 (discussing a recent Oregon State Bar ethics opinion stating that ―a lawyer does 
not have a fundamental disagreement ‗merely because the client refuses to follow the lawyer‘s 
advice or chooses a course the lawyer believes is unwise, particularly where the decision 
(settlement) is one that is squarely within the client‘s sole control‘‖). 
 12. Association Goals, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/utility/about_the_aba/association 
_goals.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) [hereinafter ABA Goals]. The preface to the most recent 
version of the ABA Model Rules states, ―for more than ninety years, the American Bar 
Association has provided leadership in legal ethics and professional responsibility through the 
adoption of professional standards which serve as models of the regulatory law governing the 
legal profession.‖ MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT preface (2010), available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_profes
sional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preface.html; see also Lucian T. Pera, 
Grading ABA Leadership on Legal Ethics Leadership: State Adoption of the Revised ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 637, 648–49 (2005). Pera 
states: 
 No one can doubt the existence, endurance, and importance of ABA leadership in 
American legal ethics. Since the early twentieth century, at least since the adoption of 
the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908, the ABA has been the dominant 
national leader in almost all issues of legal ethics and the regulation of the profession 
of law.  
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of various ethical guidelines which, over their history, have been 
sporadically and inconsistently adopted by the states.
13
 Almost all 
states, in some form, have adopted the most recent ABA ethical 
guideline, the ABA Model Rules.
14
 According to the ABA Model 
Rules regarding permissive withdrawal of counsel, an attorney may 
withdraw because of a fundamental disagreement with the client.
15
 
However, this has proven to be a delicate and unpredictable ground 
upon which to tread,
16 
as seen through case law, and it leaves many 
 
Id. He also states: 
There are three absolutely essential functions of the ABA. In order of historical 
appearance, they are: The accreditation of law schools, leadership in legal and judicial 
ethics (especially including the adoption and promulgation of model rules and 
standards), and the review of the qualifications of federal judicial nominees. Without 
any one of these three functions, the ABA would not be the same enduring, essential 
institution. 
Id. Although beyond the scope of this Note, for an interesting read on the ABA‘s participation 
in divisive social and political debates, see THE FEDERALIST SOC‘Y FOR LAW & PUBLIC POLICY 
STUDIES, THE ABA IN LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY: WHAT ROLE? (1994).  
 13. See Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA, http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/a
lpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011) [hereinafter ABA Model 
Rules Dates of Adoption].  
 14. Id. To date, California is the only state not to have adopted the Model Rules. See 
Richard Acello, New York Makes Itself a „Model‟ State: California Now The Only Holdout On 
Adopting The ABA Model Rules, A.B.A. J., 22 (Sept. 2009). Recently, however, the California 
State Bar adopted new proposed rules in order to bring itself more in line with other states that 
have adopted the ABA Model Rules, but there remain some key differences. Finally, Ethics 
Rules Head to High Court, CAL. B.J. (Oct. 2010), available at http://www.calbarjournal 
.com/October2010/TopHeadlines/TH6.aspx.  
 15. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(4) (2010), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_
conduct/rule_1_16_declining_or_terminating_representation.html. 
 16. See generally Elizabeth Mertz, Legal Ethics in the Next Generation: The Push for a 
New Legal Realism, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 237 (1998). In discussing a study of legal ethics 
conducted by the American Bar Association, Mertz notes the disconnect between the ABA‘s 
model rules and the everyday practice of attorneys:  
 A number of Shapiro‘s respondents expressed dismay about the gap, also pointed to 
by a number of our contributors, between lawyers‘ experiences of ethical dilemmas in 
day-to-day practice and the understandings of scholars and experts charged with 
formulating rules of professional conduct: ―but, you know, these guys sit around and 
the Kutak Commission [which produced the Model Rules of Professional Conduct] 
fooled around for years and years and years. And they ducked all the questions where 
we need guidance. You know, any fool could have written 1.9, 1.7. You know, ‗big 
deal, thanks a lot.‘‖ 
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ethical questions unanswered when put into practice.
17
 
In some cases, the courts have held that withdrawal was without 
good cause because the court believed, above all, that the client was 
to decide the scope of representation,
18
 even if the attorney 
disagreed.
19
 In other cases, courts allowed counsel to withdraw, 
noting precisely the ethical dilemma of the attorney (and the 
possibility of disciplinary sanctions, among other punishments
20
) if 
made to continue with representation.
21
The disagreement in the 
courts stems from their fundamental confusion as to how they should 
interpret their state‘s various ethical provisions and their relation to 
one another, which partly originates from the ABA‘s initial, unclear 
guidelines.
22
  
 
 But there‘s absolutely no guidance on parent/subsidiary. . . . There‘s almost no 
guidance on the whistle-blower problem. You know, ―thanks a bunch, guys!‖ 
Id. at 240 (Respondent quoted in Shapiro n.d.). In discussing the changing nature of the practice 
of law and the integration of business, Deborah Jeffrey notes that the ―ethics rules and their 
application have become so specialized and arcane that law firms need to call on outside ethics 
lawyers for help in negotiating their way through the basic rules of our profession.‖ Deborah 
Jeffrey, Ethical Fading, in A CENTURY OF LEGAL ETHICS—TRIAL LAWYERS AND THE ABA 
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 71, 74 (Lawrence J. Fox et al. eds., 2009). 
 17. See supra ABSTRACT.  
 18. See generally Lear, supra note 11, at 67–68 (―The attorney most certainly provides his 
or her services to the client for compensation, but only the attorney is a fiduciary to the client, 
not vice-versa. As in any fiduciary relationship, the attorney must protect the client from any 
adverse impact with respect to the legal representation and may pursue efforts to further the 
client‘s objectives of which the client may be completely unaware.‖); see also John Burkoff, 
Flipper Ethics, 31 CHAMPION 38 (2007) (―He [the client] gets to decide the basic objectives of 
the representation (as opposed to the means you will use to attain those objectives), including 
whether or not he wants to flip and change his plea to guilty.‖).  
 19. See infra Part II–III. 
 20. See MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. 10 (2010), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/resources/lawyer 
_ethics_regulation/model_rules_for_lawyer_disciplinary_enforcement/rule_10.html. The possible 
sanctions for violation of a professional rule include, but are not limited to, disbarment, 
suspension, probation, reprimands, admonitions, reimbursement of wrongly obtained fees or 
awards, costs, and future limitation on practice. Id.  
 21. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 22. In particular, one article notes: 
 Currently, the rules of professional ethics to be followed in a particular district 
within the federal court system are dictated by local rules promulgated at the district 
level. This approach has created a patchwork quilt of ethical standards within the 
federal system. A uniform approach is needed to provide certainty for the legal 
profession, to prevent forum shopping in the search for ethical guidelines favorable to 
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In particular, the relationship between the allocation of authority 
and permissive withdrawal provisions is unclear. If the attorney is 
allowed to withdraw because of a fundamental disagreement with the 
client,
23
 then why do some courts hold this to be an impermissible 
reason to cease representation? Similarly, if the attorney is not 
allowed to withdraw, then is the court effectively mandating 
violations of other ethical rules, e.g. the requirement to exercise 
independent judgment
24
 and provide diligent representation,
25
 and the 
prohibition against meritless claims?
26
  
For an attorney struggling with this problem, ethical guidelines 
must be clear and concise so as to effectively protect both the 
attorney and the client. However, each state‘s piecemeal adoption of 
the ABA model guidelines and comments,
27
 in addition to the lack of 
clear guidelines from the ABA as to how these provisions should be 
interpreted,
28
 raises more questions about what the attorney should 
and can do. 
 
a particular set of facts, and to promote public confidence in the legal profession and 
the justice system. 
Philip K. Lyon & Bruce H. Phillips, Professional Responsibility in the Federal Courts: 
Consistency is Cloaked in Confusion, 50 ARK. L. REV. 59 (1997) (footnote omitted). 
 23. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2010), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/ 
rule_1_16_declining_or_terminating_representation.html. 
 24. Id. R. 2.1 (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ 
responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_2_1_advisor.html. 
 25. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/r
ule_1_3_diligence.html. This is not to presuppose that all attorneys will not diligently represent 
the client if made to continue with representation. However, that does not effectively answer or 
address the ethical dilemma in this scenario. 
 26. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2010), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/r
ule_3_1_meritorious_claims_contentions.html. 
 27. See ABA Model Rules Dates of Adoption, supra note 13; see also MODEL RULES OF 
PROF‘L CONDUCT pmbl. (2000) (amended 2002) (―So long as a significant number of 
jurisdictions continue to base their professional standards on the predecessor Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility, the opinions will also continue to refer to the Model Code.‖). 
 28. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt [2] (2010), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_ 
professional_conduct/rule_1_2_scope_of_representation_allocation_of_authority_between_clie
nt_lawyer/comment_on_rule_1_2.html.  
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In order to provide more guidance to the ethical attorney, the 
ABA should draft a new hybrid model guideline that combines the 
black letter rule with ethical considerations similar to the ethical 
considerations contained within its 1969 Model Code,
29
 and it should 
provide substantial and detailed interpretive comments, practice 
pointers, and hypotheticals. Admittedly, this new form would 
sacrifice the leanness of the Model Rules, but the new rules would go 
further in eliminating ethical guesses. Furthermore, in order to 
address the problem of piecemeal adoption by the states (which 
consequently heightens the disconnect between the rules and their 
intended interaction), the ABA should develop a new incentive 
program as the final step in encouraging states to adopt its new 
rules—a different tactic than its usual practice of promulgation and 
advisement.
30
  
Once uniformity is achieved among the states, the different 
outcomes in courts hearing permissive withdrawal cases will likely 
come to a halt, as attorneys will be able to resolve these issues by 
obtaining clear guidance from where they should logically be able to: 
their states‘ ethics rules. Meanwhile, courts will be able to rely on 
consistent precedent when interpreting the same ethical guidelines. 
Part I of this Note tracks the history of the ABA and its various 
model guidelines, examines the current ways in which attorneys 
withdraw from representation, and concludes with a look at the 
differences between each version of the ABA model guidelines, 
specifically in relation to the withdrawal of counsel and the attorney-
client relationship provisions.
31
 Part II discusses various circuit court 
cases that have addressed the issue of permissive withdrawal in 
situations in which the client refuses to settle and outlines the 
 
 29. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY (1969) (amended 1980), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.pdf. 
 30. See generally Center for Professional Responsibility Policy Implementation 
Committee, ABA, http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=CP024000 (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2011). The ABA‘s Center for Professional Responsibility Policy Implementation 
Committee oversees the implementation of recent revisions to the Model Rules and provides 
assistance to jurisdictions wishing to adopt these rules. Id.  
 31. For purposes of this Note, provisions relating to the client engaging in or encouraging 
illegal conduct, which would raise other ethical issues for the attorney, will not be discussed. 
This Note focuses on a permissive withdrawal based on disagreement between an attorney and 
client in a civil matter.  
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relevant facts and holdings of each case. Part III compares the effect 
of a particular jurisdiction‘s ethical rules on the circuit court 
decisions that have disallowed permissive withdrawal with other 
jurisdictions under the same or similar guidance. Finally, Part IV 
proposes recommendations for achieving uniformity and consistency 
among the states in order to dispel the confusion in the courts and to 
provide better guidance to the attorney facing this ethical dilemma. 
I. 
A. History of ABA Model Guidelines
32
 
Prior to the adoption of the ABA Model Rules in 1983 (1983 
ABA Model Rules), the ABA distributed two models intended to 
serve as ethical guidelines for practicing attorneys.
33
 The first, the 
Canons of Professional Ethics (ABA Canons), was adopted in 1908
34
 
and remained in effect until 1969, when the ABA replaced it with the 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (ABA Model Code).
35
 
Most recently, in 1997, the ABA commissioned a task force, the 
Ethics 2000 Commission, to review and provide recommendations 
for revisions to the 1983 ABA Model Rules; the ABA adopted the 
recommendations in 2002 (ABA Model Rules).
36
 The changing focus 
 
 32. For a look at the history of the ABA, see EDSON R. SUNDERLAND, HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND ITS WORK (1953). 
 33. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct: About the Model Rules, ABA, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/model_rules.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2011) [hereinafter 
ABA About the Model Rules]. The ABA‘s project in the early twentieth-century to create a set 
of model ethical rules and guidelines for practicing attorneys has been described as one of its 
key functions that has persisted to this day. Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for 
Lawyers: An 800-Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385, 1439 (2004) (the ―principal 
advancement that the ABA brought to the field of legal ethics was conversion of ethical 
standards into workable and enforceable rules of law. Indeed, most states have adopted the 
ABA‘s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, or some variation on them, as binding rules of 
law.‖).  
 34. See CANONS OF PROF‘L ETHICS (1908), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ 
mrpc/Canons_Ethics.pdf [hereinafter ABA CANONS]. 
 35. See MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY (1969) (amended 1980), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.pdf. 
 36. See generally Ethics 2000 Commission, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).  
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of the ABA on ethical issues and the role of the lawyer are reflected 
not only in the provisions‘ interpretative comments, but also in the 
form in which the model guidelines were drafted.
37
 The ABA Canons 
were modeled after the Alabama State Bar Association‘s code of 
ethics,
38
 which were adopted in 1887 after the state realized that a 
comprehensive guideline was needed in order to prevent and curtail 
avoidable, improper misconduct by lawyers.
39
 Similarly, in keeping 
with its mission to ensure that the legal profession as a whole 
maintained a high level of ethical conduct guided by the formulation 
 
 37. See NEW JERSEY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, Report of the Special Committee of the 
New Jersey State Bar Association to Review the Rules of Professional Conduct Promulgated by 
the Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards of the American Bar Association, in 
RESPONSES TO DISCUSSION OF DRAFT OF MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: 
GENERAL COMMENTS 8 (1980) [hereinafter New Jersey State Bar Report]. The New Jersey 
State Bar Association applauded the new focus of the 1983 ABA Model Rules:  
 Historically, the conduct of lawyers has been regulated by Canons of Ethics and 
Rules of Discipline. These canons and rules have been applied uniformly and broadly 
to all activity of the lawyer. No attempt was made to distinguish specific standards 
dependent upon the specific function performed by the lawyer . . . . By contrast, the 
Kutak Commission has created a body of rules classified according to the role of the 
lawyer as advisor, advocate, negotiator, intermediary, and legal evaluator. 
Id. The New Jersey State Bar Association continued with a comment on the particular form of 
the 1983 ABA Model Rules, which were formulated in part to better fit the Commission‘s new 
focus on the various roles of the lawyer. Id. at 9. However, it also noted the ―over-lapping‖ of 
several roles of the lawyer, such that the standards differ in separate provisions of the 1983 
Model Rules. Id. 
 38. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT preface (2010), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_
conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preface.html. The ABA Canons were based 
principally on the Code of Ethics adopted by the Alabama Bar Association in 1887, which in 
turn had been borrowed largely from the lectures of Judge George Sharswood, published in 
1854 as Professional Ethics, and from the fifty resolutions included in David Hoffman‘s A 
Course of Legal Study (2d ed. 1836). Id.  
 39. See Andrews, supra note 33, at 1435–36. Andrews describes Thomas Goode Jones as 
a ―a prominent Alabama lawyer and later Alabama Governor and federal judge,‖ id. at 1435 
n.368, and his influence in the formation of the Alabama Code of Ethics: 
 In 1882, Thomas Goode Jones proposed that the newly formed Alabama State Bar 
Association create a code of ethics. Jones argued that many cases of improper conduct 
by lawyers were ―thoughtless rather than willful‖ and could be avoided if the lawyers 
had ―within easy reach‖ a ―short, concise Code of Legal Ethics, stamped with the 
approval of the Bar.‖  
Id. at 1435. 
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of clear principles,
40
 the ABA drafted the ABA Canons to provide 
uniform guidelines for attorneys across the country.
41
 The ABA 
Canons were adopted by ―nearly every state and local bar association 
in the country . . . with no more than minor changes.‖42 Despite its 
widespread adoption, the ABA Canons were criticized as not being 
―an effective teaching instrument and fail[ing] to give guidance to 
young lawyers beyond the language of the Canons themselves . . . .‖43 
They were, however, seen as a good starting point for the 
amalgamation of standard ethical principles in general, as the ABA 
Canons ―‗crystallize[d]‘ existing principles of legal ethics‖ and 
 
 40. Andrews, supra note 33, at 1439–40. In addition, Susan Martyn notes that the 
preamble of the 1908 Canons dramatically announced that 
 the future of the republic was at stake. They [the drafters of the ABA 1908 Canons] 
then expressed their specific purpose—to promote public confidence in the 
administration of justice by maintaining ―Justice pure and unsullied.‖ And they 
believed that justice could not ―be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of 
the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men.‖ 
Susan R. Martyn, Back to the Future: Fiduciary Duty Then and Now, in A CENTURY OF LEGAL 
ETHICS: TRIAL LAWYERS AND THE ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 3 (Lawrence J. 
Fox et al. eds., 2009) (footnotes omitted).  
 41. See Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Introduction, in A CENTURY OF LEGAL ETHICS, TRIAL 
LAWYERS AND THE ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS xxix, xxxi (Lawrence J. Fox et al. 
eds., 2009). In tracing the history of the ABA and its model guidelines, Justice Alito described 
the need for uniform guidelines: 
 1908, when the canons were passed, was a period of flux for legal practice. During 
the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, the structure of legal 
practice was changing from the small town, all-purpose lawyer, to the bigger and more 
specialized law firms of the kind we are intimately familiar with today. With this 
change in business models for the legal practice came the need for a uniform code of 
ethics that would govern across geographical boundaries. 
Id. 
 42. Ted Schneyer, How Things Have Changed: Contrasting the Regulatory Environments 
of the Canons and the Model Rules, 2008 J. PROF. LAW. 161, 168. The intention of the ABA 
Canons was construed in different ways, however, with some under the belief they were ―only 
intended to be fraternal admonitions,‖ and others firmly believing that the intention of the ABA 
Canons was for states and courts to enact or rule them into positive law. Id. at 174–75. Either 
way, the ABA Canons ―did not state that they were meant to be enforceable,‖ id. at 174, but 
were intended to ―provide a ‗general guide,‘ which should not be construed as limiting other 
‗equally imperative though not specifically mentioned‘ obligations.‖ Martyn, supra note 40, at 
3–4.  
 43. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY preface (1969) (amended 1980). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
394 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:383 
 
 
―critiqued the standards, updated them to some degree, and, more 
importantly, nationalized them.‖44  
The 1969 ABA Model Code
45
 was adopted with the hope that it 
would help resolve ethical questions about professional responsibility 
left unanswered by the ABA Canons and provide a ―set of principles 
designed to be more specific and more amenable to disciplinary 
enforcement.‖46 However, after its adoption by most states47 and 
subsequent scrutiny, it was found to have ―answered many questions 
badly and left others unresolved altogether.‖48 The ABA Model Code 
was a ―restatement of existing ethical principles, with new wording 
and detail,‖ in addition to the incorporation of the past fifty years of 
 
 44. Andrews, supra note 33, at 1442. Andrews notes that ―[o]ver the next thirty years, the 
ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added two more. In addition, the ABA issued 
hundreds of opinions (both formally and informally) as to the proper interpretation and 
application of the canons.‖ Id. at 1443 (footnotes omitted); see also ABA CANONS, supra note 
34. 
 45. Andrews remarks that ―[t]he Model Code had a novel format, with three components: 
the Canons, Ethical Considerations, and the Disciplinary Rules.‖ Andrews, supra note 33, at 
1444. The ABA Canons had consisted entirely of the ethical canons themselves. See ABA 
CANONS, supra note 34. 
 46. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: 
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 12 (10th ed. 2008); see also Martyn, supra note 40, at 6 ( ―For the 
first time, the narrative general guides of the canons were replaced with a code that included 
both black-letter disciplinary rules and narrative ethical conclusions.‖); Alito, supra note 41, at 
xxxiv (―For the first time, the ABA included in the preamble to the code that a violation of the 
disciplinary rules would subject the lawyer to discipline.‖). 
 47. See Pera, supra note 4, at 648. He writes: 
 When the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional Conduct replaced the influential 
1908 Canons, in very short order, every American jurisdiction adopted ethics rules 
based on, and closely patterned after, the new Model Code. The adoption by the 
jurisdictions of new rules patterned after the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct, however, proceeded much more slowly; indeed, two states have not moved 
to the Model Rules even as I write [in 2005]. 
Id. 
 48. MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 46, at 1–2; see also Steven Krane, Ethics 2000: 
What Might Have Been, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 323, 325 (1999). Krane states the Model Code  
[Was] not without its deficiencies. It focused almost exclusively on the professional 
responsibilities of litigating attorneys, ignoring the many lawyers who are perfectly 
happy never to see the inside of a courtroom. It barely touched on the obligations of 
lawyers representing organizational clients, or of those who work in large bureaucratic 
public and private firms. Instead, the Code continued to proceed from the outdated 
paradigm of the individual lawyer representing an individual client. 
Id. 
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court and ABA opinions.
49
 However, it failed to clearly set forth 
guidelines for enforcement and discipline, which ultimately was the 
reason it ―never achieved stability.‖50 
The 1983 ABA Model Rules
51
 were adopted amidst contentious 
disagreements about the scope and content of the rules, in addition to 
continued opposition to the necessity of a revision of the ABA Model 
Code in the first place.
52
 Indeed, ―one will find more nonuniform 
versions of the Model Rules than existed during the heyday of the 
Model Code. In fact, a few jurisdictions still follow the format of the 
 
 49. Andrews, supra note 33, at 1444–45.  
 50. Id. at 1445–46. 
 51. See Martyn, supra note 40, at 6. Martyn writes that ―[h]ere, rules replace code and 
canons. Both the common law and disciplinary rules now consciously mirror each other and 
provide significant content to the lawyer‘s obligations.‖ Id. The author emphasizes that the core 
fiduciary duties, what she labels the ―5 C‘s,‖ have been ―a part of the common law for 200 
years,‖ but are ―more carefully and clearly articulated today.‖ Id. at 7; see also Robert Meserve, 
Chairperson‘s Introduction, MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT, (1983) (amended 2002), 
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/2001/ABA_CODE.HTM. The introduction 
stresses the intent of the 1983 Model Rules and the importance of viewing (and adopting) the 
Model Rules as a coherent whole: 
 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct are intended to serve as a national 
framework for implementation of standards of professional conduct. Although the 
Commission endeavored to harmonize and accommodate the views of all the 
participants, no set of national standards that speaks to such a diverse constituency as 
the legal profession can resolve each issue to the complete satisfaction of every 
affected party. Undoubtedly there will be those who take issue with one or another of 
the Rules‘ provisions. Indeed, such dissent from individual provisions is expected. 
And the Model Rules, like all model legislation, will be subject to modification at the 
level of local implementation. Viewed as a whole, however, the Model Rules represent 
a responsible approach to the ethical practice of law and are consistent with 
professional obligations imposed by other law, such as constitutional, corporate, tort, 
fiduciary and agency law.  
Id. 
 52. Schneyer, supra note 42, at 171. Schneyer notes that the California and New York 
State Bar Associations opposed the Model Rules and only ceased their strident opposition when
―it became clear that some version would be adopted.‖ Id. In contrast, Pera stated: 
 Although the ABA had amended the Model Rules from time to time during the 
intervening two decades, the consensus among the ABA leadership and lawyers in the 
area of ethics and professional responsibility was that the many changes in the legal 
profession as well as in the world of its clients since 1983 warranted a complete review 
of the ABA Model Rules. New issues needed to be addressed; new case law 
developments needed to be recognized, incorporated, or rejected; and some old issues 
needed to be readdressed. 
Pera, supra note 12, at 639. 
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Model Code although the substance is usually similar to the Model 
Rules.‖53 Nevertheless, the 1983 ABA Model Rules were adopted to 
address the progression of the legal profession from its traditional 
role as ―mouthpieces‖ or ―hired guns‖ to a more modern, integrated, 
and responsible profession.
54
 
In order to provide greater clarity to states on the interpretation 
and application of the substance of the 1983 ABA Model Rules,
55
 in 
1997 the ABA created the Ethics 2000 Commission to review and 
revise the 1983 ABA Model Rules.
56
 Their work culminated in the 
2002 version of the Model Rules.
57
 Similar to the prior versions of 
 
 53. MORGAN & ROTUNDA, supra note 46, at 13. The authors note: 
[As] of 2002, over forty-two jurisdictions had revised their own rules to follow the 
1983 Model Rules in substantial part. Others had amended their Model Code to adopt 
important 1983 Model Rules ideas. By early 2008, several states had adopted the 
Model Rules substantially as amended in 2002–03. Several others had established 
committees to review the 2002–03 changes and more state supreme courts are likely to 
adopt them in due course. 
Id.  
 54. See New Jersey State Bar Report, supra note 37, at 10–11. One of the purposes of the 
1983 ABA Model Rules, to ―make the lawyer more responsible to his clients, to the public, and 
to his profession,‖ was part of the ABA‘s ―inten[tion] to meet the mounting criticism of the 
profession in a modern society which has become increasingly disenchanted with the traditional 
role of the lawyer in the adversary system.‖ Id.  
 55. Andrews, supra note 33, at 1449; see also Pera, supra note 12, at 640 (―[T]he 
legitimate needs of practicing lawyers and their clients and related institutional concerns that 
ABA leadership in legal ethics should be preserved and strengthened had combined to create 
increasingly intense pressure for greater uniformity among jurisdictions on the rules that 
governed how we practice law.‖). 
 56. ABA About the Model Rules, supra note 33; see also Margaret Colgate Love, The 
Revised ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct: Summary of the Work of Ethics 2000, 15 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 441 (2002) (describing the major changes made to the 1983 ABA Model 
Rules). Steven Krane also notes that: 
 Early on, it became apparent that the Commission, dubbed ―Ethics 2000,‖ did not 
intend to do more than tinker with the existing platform provided by the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct . . . . As a result, what is emerging from the Commission is 
not a proposed regulatory scheme for the next century, but merely an updating of the 
existing set of Model Rules, driven to a great extent by the view that the substance of 
the American Law Institute‘s recently completed Restatement of the Law Governing 
Lawyers should be imported into the Rules. 
Krane, supra note 48, at 323–24. 
 57. For a chart of the states that have adopted the revised rules, see Status of State Review 
of Professional Conduct Rules, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/ 
cpr/pic/ethics_2000_status_chart.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). For a 
comparison of the states‘ revised rules and the ABA revised rules, see Charts Comparing 
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the ABA model guidelines, adoption of the 2002 ABA Model Rules 
was not unanimous by all the states.
58
 Of those who have adopted the 
2002 ABA Model Rules, not all have adopted the interpretive 
comments that were meant to elaborate on the black letter rules.
59
 As 
a result, differing interpretations of the 2002 ABA Model Rules 
provisions arise even within the same judicial district.
60
  
B. The Current 2002 ABA Model Rules Withdrawal Provisions  
and Procedure  
ABA 2002 Model Rule 1.16, the provision on termination of 
representation, mandates withdrawal in three circumstances: when 
―(1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of 
professional conduct or other law; (2) the lawyer‘s physical or mental 
condition materially impairs the lawyer‘s ability to represent the 
client; or (3) the lawyer is discharged.‖61 Other than these three 
situations, the lawyer may choose to withdraw from representation 
for a variety of reasons, including when ―the client insists upon 
taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the 
lawyer has a fundamental disagreement.‖62 In either mandatory or 
 
Professional Conduct Rules, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_ respons 
ibility/policy/charts.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). ABA has amended individual rules since 
the adoption of the 2002 Model Rules as a whole, but as these amendments are not related to 
the topic of this Note, they will not be discussed. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT 
preface (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_pref
ace.html; Andrews, supra note 33, at 1385, 1450. 
 58. ABA Model Rules Dates of Adoption, supra note 13. 
 59. See infra Part III. 
 60. See infra Part III. 
 61. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R.1.16 (2010). 
 62. Id. The full ABA Model Rule 1.16 states that an attorney may withdraw when: 
 (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests 
of the client;  
 (2) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer‘s services that the 
lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;  
 (3) the client has used the lawyer‘s services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;  
 (4) the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with 
which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; 
 (5) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the 
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permissive withdrawal, the attorney must ensure that the client‘s 
interests have been reasonably protected from harm that may arise 
from the attorney‘s withdrawal, and the attorney must give proper 
notice to the applicable tribunal.
63
  
The ABA‘s comments to this rule elaborate upon its particular 
provisions and point to other rules and duties that may be affected by 
an attorney‘s withdrawal. For example, Comment 1 states that, as an 
initial matter, an attorney ―should not accept representation in a 
matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, without 
improper conflict of interest and to completion,‖ and it points to 
Rules 1.2(c), 6.5, and 1.3, Comment 4.
64
 The remaining comments 
expand upon mandatory withdrawal, discharge by the client, and 
optional withdrawal provisions, and discuss the requirement that the 
lawyer assist the client upon withdrawal.
65
 
C. The Variances between the ABA Model Guidelines 
1. ABA 2002 and 1983 Model Rules 
The 2002 ABA Model Rules revised the language of the 1983 
ABA Model Rules provision regarding permissive withdrawal of 
counsel. The 2002 Rules state that an attorney may withdraw from 
counsel when the ―client insists upon taking action that the lawyer 
considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental 
disagreement.‖66 The 1983 ABA Model Rules did not contain the 
―fundamental disagreement‖ language, although they did provide that 
the attorney could withdraw when actions taken by the client were 
 
lawyer‘s services and has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw 
unless the obligation is fulfilled; 
 (6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer 
or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or  
 (7) other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
Id.  
 63. Id. at R. 1.16(c), (d). 
 64. Id. at cmt. 1. 
 65. Id. at cmts. 
 66. Id. at R. 1.16(b)(4).  
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―imprudent.‖67 In addition, the 2002 ABA commentary to the 
permissive withdrawal section states that a lawyer may withdraw for 
good cause ―even if it causes material adverse impact to the client,‖ 
even though the good cause for withdrawal does not arise out of 
something illegal.
68 
Although the Ethics 2000 Commission changed 
the language slightly in order to ―clarify [the] significance of 
permission to withdraw,‖69 the ABA stressed that ―no change in 
substance is intended‖ from the 1983 Model Rules comment.702002 
ABA Model Rule 1.2 Scope of Representation and Allocation of 
Authority Between Client and Lawyer
71
 states that ―a lawyer shall 
abide by a client‘s decisions concerning the objectives of 
representation.‖72 The ABA Model Rules deleted the 1983 Model 
 
 67. RICHARD ZITRIN, CAROL LANGFORD & KEVIN MOHR, LEGAL ETHICS: RULES, 
STATUTES, AND COMPARISONS 343 (2008) (comparing 1983 and 2002 versions of the Model 
Rules); see also AM. BAR ASS‘N., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 1982–2005, 360 (2006). The Ethics 2000 
Commission Reporter‘s Explanation of Changes states that the reason the Commission changed 
the language from ―imprudent‖ to ―fundamental disagreement‖ was to prevent 
 [a]llowing a lawyer to withdraw merely because the lawyer believes that the client‘s 
objectives or intended action is ―imprudent‖ [which] permits the lawyer to threaten to 
withdraw in order to prevail in almost any dispute with a client, thus detracting from 
the client‘s ability to direct the course of the representation. Nevertheless, the 
Commission believes that a lawyer ought to be permitted to withdraw when the 
disagreement over objectives or means is so fundamental that the lawyer‘s autonomy 
is seriously threatened. 
Reporter‟s Explanation of Changes, Model Rule 1.16, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/professional_responsibility/policy/ethics_2000_commission/e2k_rule116rem.html (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 68. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A 
STUDENT‘S GUIDE 634 (2008–2009); see also AM. BAR ASS‘N., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 67. 
 69. AM. BAR ASS‘N., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 67. 
 70. Id.  
 71. The 1983 Model Rules title to this provision was ―Scope of Representation.‖ The 
2002 version added the allocation language. See ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 68, at 
94. 
 72. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT, R. 1.2(a) (2010). The rule also states that the 
attorney  
 may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out 
the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decision whether to settle a 
matter. In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client‘s decision, after 
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and 
whether the client will testify.  
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Rules
73
 comment that ―both lawyer and client have authority and 
responsibility in the objectives and means of representation‖ and 
made it clear that it is the client‘s ―ultimate authority.‖74 The ABA 
Model Rules comment to this provision also deleted the 1983 
comment that ―a lawyer is not required to pursue objectives or 
employ means simply because the client may wish the lawyer to do 
so.‖75 Instead, it added to this provision an explanation that in some 
cases, ―because of the varied nature of the matters about which a 
lawyer and client might disagree and because the actions in question 
may implicate the interests of a tribunal or other persons, this Rule 
does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be resolved.‖76 The 
2002 commentary continues to suggest that the attorney should 
consult other applicable law, attempt to reconcile with the client, and 
if ―such efforts are unavailing and the lawyer has a fundamental 
disagreement with the client, the lawyer may withdraw from the 
representation.‖77  
2. 1983 ABA Model Rules and 1969 Model Code
78
 
As stated above, 1983 ABA Model Rule 1.16 allows for 
withdrawal of representation when ―a client insists upon pursuing an 
 
Id.  
 73. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1.2 (1983); see also ZITRIN, LANGFORD 
& MOHR, supra note 67, at 277. 
 74. ZITRIN, LANGFORD & MOHR, supra note 67, at 277. 
 75. Id. at 142. 
 76. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 68, at 92. 
 77. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 2 (2010). The change in the language 
from the 1983 version to the 2002 version is seen as a result of the influence of the Restatement 
of the Law Governing Lawyers, Third‘s provisions on the attorney-client relationship, which 
took an even more restrictive view on the allocation of authority between the client and 
attorney. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 68, at 110. The Restatement ―adopts the view 
that a lawyer‘s conduct in setting the means of a representation affects the client‘s interests and 
therefore clients should have control over means as well as objectives.‖ Id. The ABA notes, 
however, that if the ―lawyer and the client disagree as to the means, the client‘s choice should 
be honored or the lawyer should consider terminating the representation.‖ Id. 
 78. For a chart showing the applicable ABA Model Rules that pertain to a particular ABA 
Model Code provision, see Model Code & Model Rules Comparison, LEGAL INFORMATION 
INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/aba/mcpr/COMPARISON.HTM#EC_2-32 (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
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objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent.‖79 Both 
the 2002 and 1983 ABA Model Rule versions of Rule 1.16 allow for 
withdrawal when ―other good cause exists,‖80 which was not included 
in the 1969 Code, and withdrawal is ―not limited to cases where the 
tribunal finds good cause.‖81 The 1969 Model Code, Disciplinary 
Rule-2-110(C), permitted withdrawal ―regardless of the effect on the 
client if: (1) His client . . . insists, in a matter not pending before a 
tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the 
judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the 
Disciplinary Rules.‖82 Ethical Consideration 2-32 further provides 
that the ―decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on 
the basis of compelling circumstances.‖83 
1983 ABA Model Rule 1.2(a) loosely parallels the ethical 
considerations in Canon 7 from 1908. Specifically, Ethical 
Consideration 7-8 states that the client has the final say on whether to 
―forego legally available objectives or methods because of nonlegal 
factors‖ but that ―[i]n the event the client in a nonadjudicatory matter 
insists upon a course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment and 
advice of the lawyer but not prohibited by Disciplinary Rules, the 
lawyer may withdraw from the employment,‖ which pointed to the 
disciplinary rule regarding termination of counsel, as noted above.
84
 
3. 1969 ABA Model Code and 1908 Canons 
The 1908 ABA Canon dealt broadly with withdrawal from 
employment as counsel. It stated that the right to withdraw must 
 
 79. MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16(b)(3) (1983) (amended 2002). 
 80. Id. R. 1.16(b)(7). 
 81. ROTUNDA & DZIENKOWSKI, supra note 68, at 634. 
 82. ZITRIN, LANGFORD & MOHR, supra note 67, at 180. 
 83. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-32 (1980). 
 84. ZITRIN, LANGFORD & MOHR, supra note 67, at 143. MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(B)(1) (1980) also states that ―a lawyer may, ‗where permissible, 
exercise his professional judgment to waive or fail to assert a right or position of his client.‘‖ Id.  
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―arise only from good cause,‖ which may result from a client 
insisting on pursuing a pointless case or ―if the lawyer finds himself 
incapable of conducting the case effectively.‖85 In relation to the 
allocation of power between the attorney and client, ABA Canon 16 
stated the lawyer should use his ―best efforts‖ to stop a client from 
pursuing actions ―which the lawyer himself ought not to do,‖ and if 
the ―client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should terminate 
their relation.‖86 Furthermore, ABA Canon 24 allowed the lawyer to 
decide the ―incidental matters pending the trial,‖ and ―[i]n such 
matters no client has a right to demand that his counsel shall be 
illiberal, or that he do anything therein repugnant to his own sense of 
honor and propriety.‖87 
 
 85. The ABA discussed the issue of withdrawal in 1961 and again in 1965 by looking to 
Canon 44 for guidance. The question the ABA addressed in the first informal opinion was 
whether an attorney was justified in withdrawing as counsel when, on the day of trial, the 
opposing party gave an offer of settlement and the client refused to accept. ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Informal Op. C-455 (1961). The ABA stated: ―[u]nder the 
terms of Canon 44, the lawyer should not throw up the unfinished task to the detriment of his 
client, except for reasons of honor or self-respect.‖ Id. It went on to say that ―[t]he mere fact 
that in the attorney‘s judgment the settlement offer is equal to or greater than the probable 
amount of a jury verdict, in our opinion does not give him ‗good cause‘ to withdraw from the 
employment assumed.‖ Id. This is clarified in the second informal opinion in which the ABA 
stated that ―if the lawyer honestly believes that he can no longer represent the client effectively 
and that withdrawal will not be detrimental to the client, it is our opinion that the attorney could 
ethically state that he preferred to withdraw effective upon substitution of other counsel.‖ ABA 
Comm. on Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Informal Op. 807 (1965); see also ABA Comm. on 
Ethics and Prof‘l Responsibility, Informal Op. C-780 (1964) (―Canon 44 provides that a lawyer 
is justified in withdrawing from the case ‗if the lawyer finds himself incapable of conducting 
the case effectively.‘ Certainly he cannot conduct the case effectively without his client‘s 
cooperation.‖). 
 86. CANONS OF PROF‘L ETHICS Canon 16 (1908).  
 87. Id.  
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II. CIRCUIT COURT CASES
88
 
In addition to the varied nature of the ABA‘s model guidelines 
over the years, courts have created a conflicting body of case law that 
addresses the particular question of permissive withdrawal of counsel 
and, implicitly, the nature of the relationship between the attorney 
and client.
89
 In a Seventh Circuit case, Banks v. Andersen Consulting, 
LLP, the court upheld the grant of a motion to withdraw as counsel 
after the attorney stated that it would create an ethical conflict for her 
to continue representing the client when the client wished to continue 
 
 88. District court cases demonstrate a wider disparity of opinions on this issue, even 
within the same district. For example, the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of New York heard Heileman v. Administrator of the Veterans Administration, No. 82 Civ. 
7036-CSH, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15400, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1985), in which the court 
denied the attorney‘s motion to withdraw after the client refused to listen to the attorney‘s 
advice to accept a settlement offer. The attorney claimed that the client expressed an attitude of 
―thinking that he knows how to handle it and he prefers to handle it his way.‖ Id. at *2. The 
court criticized the attorney and stated that ―[r]ather than acknowledging that it is his 
professional obligation to carry out his clients‘ instructions, even perhaps against his better 
judgment, counsel instead insists that his clients must follow his advice or he will withdraw his 
services.‖ Id. In so denying the motion to withdraw, the court looked to the Model Code of 
Professional Responsibility for support of its interpretation of the permissible bounds of 
attorney autonomy. Id. at *4–*5. 
 However, another case in the same district held that an attorney seeking to withdraw 
because the client refused to accept a settlement was permissible. Best v. City of New York, 04 
Civ. 10114 (BSJ) (RLE), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28106, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005). In 
Best, the court noted that the client‘s refusal to accept settlement was not a ―good and sufficient 
cause to withdraw‖ but allowed the attorney to do so because it was not in the client‘s best 
interests to have an attorney who had no interest in the case represent the client. Id. at *3. 
 Similarly, in WABC-AM Radio, Inc. v. Vlahos, 89 Civ. 1645 (CSH), 1992 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14771, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992), the court granted the attorney‘s motion to 
withdraw due to the breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. In addition to failing to pay 
attorney fees, the client had refused several times to accept advice regarding settlement. Id. at 
*1–*2. The court noted that even though relief would cause delay in the matter, the attorneys 
should be allowed to withdraw from the case. Id. at *4. Interestingly, this case was heard by the 
same judge as the Heileman case above, in which the court denied the attorney‘s motion to 
withdraw. 
 Other district court cases—and again even those within the same circuit—exhibit this 
disconnect. The proposals for resolving the differences in circuit court opinions discussed in 
Part IV apply with equal force to the confusion exhibited in the district courts. See infra Part IV. 
 89. This Note addresses the ethical dilemma that stems from a client refusing to listen to 
an attorney‘s advice in a civil matter. For a separate, but related, issue involving clients refusing 
to listen to an attorney‘s advice in a criminal matter, and specifically in relation to plea 
bargains, see Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that it would constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel if the attorney had not warned the client that withdrawal of 
counsel was likely if the client did not heed the attorney‘s advice to accept the plea bargain).  
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representation despite the attorney‘s belief that the case would not 
survive summary judgment.
90
 The appellate court noted that the trial 
court had ―properly considered Hakeem‘s ethical concerns regarding 
the continuation of her client‘s case as a valid reason for her 
withdrawal.‖91 The court concluded that ―[w]hen a client rejects her 
counsel‘s advice, counsel may withdraw from the case,‖ and it 
ultimately dismissed the client‘s appeal.92 Also within the Seventh 
Circuit, a trial court allowed counsel to withdraw (on the very day of 
trial) when the clients had agreed to settle but then changed their 
minds and demanded the attorney continue.
93
 The circuit court upheld 
the district court‘s ruling, finding that the circumstances of the case 
(the client did not follow the attorney‘s advice and did not object to 
the withdrawal) warranted the trial court‘s exercise of discretion in 
allowing the attorney to withdraw.
94
  
The Seventh Circuit in Jiricko v. Illinois Anesthesia, Ltd. again 
upheld the trial court‘s grant of a motion to withdraw when counsel 
filed a motion that they would not be able to ―successfully pursue the 
lawsuit.‖95 The circuit court noted that counsel believed the case 
would not be successful, and that the contract between the attorney 
and client had allowed for counsel‘s withdrawal if the attorney did 
not feel the case had merit.
96
 Thus, the court recognized the trial 
court‘s action was ―entirely proper‖ based upon the circumstances of 
the case.
97
 
The Second Circuit also allowed an attorney to withdraw when 
the client refused to accept the attorney‘s advice on the eve of trial.98 
In Whiting v. Lacara, the court allowed the attorney to withdraw after 
the client said he could dictate legal strategies and then sue the 
 
 90. Banks v. Andersen Consulting, LLP, No. 97-3110, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6555, at 
*1, *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 27, 1998).  
 91. Id. at *4.  
 92. Id.  
 93. Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 94. Id. at 1088. 
 95. Jiricko v. Ill. Anesthesia, Ltd., Nos. 92-2613, 92-2682, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22030, 
at *2 (7th Cir. Aug. 17, 1993). 
 96. Id. at *5–*6. 
 97. Id. at *6. 
 98. Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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attorney if the attorney did not do as he wanted.
99
 The court 
recognized the ethical conflict in this situation: ―if required to 
continue to represent Whiting, Lacara will have to choose between 
exposure to a malpractice action or to potential Rule 11 or other 
sanctions,‖ and so it overturned a lower-court decision denying the 
attorney‘s withdrawal motion.100  
In the First Circuit, the circuit court dismissed the client‘s appeal 
in no uncertain terms: ―[t]here is no doubt that there is no substantial 
question that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing 
appellants‘ counsel to withdraw.‖101 The client in this case had 
expressed ―dissatisfaction with his counsel, his unwillingness to 
cooperate with counsel‘s plans and state[d] his intention of bringing 
in a new lawyer‖ and had ―ignored his counsel‘s advice.‖102 The 
circuit court dismissed the client‘s arguments that the withdrawal of 
counsel had resulted in a forced settlement because he did not have 
counsel or a continuance,
103
 as the client was ―solely responsible for 
the position in which he found himself.‖104 
The two circuit court opinions that held contrary to the majority of 
circuits were Nehad v. Mukasey, in the Ninth Circuit,
105
 and 
Augustson v. Linea Aerea Nacional-Chile S.A., another Fifth Circuit 
case.
106
 In Nehad, the client was an immigrant facing deportation 
charges.
107
 The client sought asylum, but, two hours before meeting 
 
 99. Id. at 322. 
 100. Id. at 323. 
 101. Citibank, N.A. v. Accounting Sys., No. 90-1145, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14377, at *8 
(1st Cir. Aug. 7, 1990). 
 102. Id.  
 103. The court noted that the client had neither asked for a continuance nor objected to 
proceeding pro se. Id. at *9. 
 104. Id. at *9.  
 105. 535 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2008). At first glance, the Ninth Circuit case seems like an 
outlier—it is from a jurisdiction that has not adopted the ABA rules and thus may be dismissed 
as a ―free-agent.‖ See Mark Hansen, HOT Off the PRESS: Revised Model Ethics Rules Are 
Nearly Ready for State Scrutiny, 88 A.B.A. J. 37, 38 (June 2002) (―California, perhaps not 
surprisingly, has a unique system of lawyer regulation.‖). However, because California‘s 
provision on permissive withdrawal closely mirrors the ABA Model Code‘s provision on 
permissive withdrawal, it may be analyzed in relation to the other cases/jurisdictions that are 
influenced by the ABA Model Code. See CAL. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3-700 (2010), 
available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ethics/ca/code/CA_CODE.HTM.  
 106. 76 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 107. 535 F.3d at 965. 
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with the immigration judge, the client claimed that his attorney had 
recommended that he accept voluntary departure in lieu of 
proceeding with the removal hearing.
108
 The client agreed to 
voluntary departure at that time but challenged it later under the 
claim that he had not received effective assistance of counsel.
109
 The 
Ninth Circuit found that the attorney had pressured his client to 
accept voluntary departure, which led the client to misunderstand his 
position and the options available to him.
110
 The court thus found that 
the attorney‘s violation of the California Rules of Professional 
Conduct had resulted in prejudice to the client and remanded the case 
accordingly.
111
  
In Augustson, the Fifth Circuit reviewed the lower court‘s award 
of attorney‘s fees to attorneys who had withdrawn as counsel.112 The 
attorneys had attempted to settle on the basis of their legal opinion 
that the potential award for the plaintiffs would be minimal.
113
 The 
plaintiffs refused to settle, despite the attorneys obtaining a higher 
 
 108. Id. The client also claimed that his attorney had considered his claim for asylum to be 
―weak‖ and that the attorney would not represent him after that day because his case was 
complicated and he had some personal issues. Id.  
 109. Id. at 966. 
 110. Id. at 969. Specifically, the court found that:  
 Speyer presented Rawshan with (1) his inability to continue with the representation 
beyond that day‘s hearing, without any explanation of how Rawshan might obtain new 
counsel (or even that he could likely obtain a continuance to do so); (2) a (new) [sic] 
negative assessment of the merits of Rawshan‘s claim; and (3) an offer of voluntary 
departure, without any exploration of other options (e.g., asking for a continuance to 
obtain new counsel, requesting voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal 
proceedings), all within hours of a scheduled hearing. 
Id. The court further noted that in California, the rule on withdrawal of counsel ―requires that a 
lawyer take all steps reasonably necessary to protect his client when he withdraws, specifically 
including ‗giving due notice to the client‘ and ‗allowing time for employment of other 
counsel.‘‖ Id. at 970 (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3-700(A)(2) (1988)). In 
addition, the court stated that the allocation of authority between attorney and client necessarily 
mandated that ―a lawyer may not burden a client‘s decisionmaking by threatening to withdraw 
if the client refuses to settle.‖ Id. at 970–71. 
 111. Id. at 973. 
 112. Augustson v. Linea Aerea Nacional-Chile S.A., 76 F.3d 658, 660 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 113. Id. at 661. The particular plaintiffs in this case sued the airline for willful misconduct 
in the wrongful death of their family members. The plaintiffs would have had to show that the 
airline‘s actions were of willful misconduct for all claims, a standard that the attorneys believed 
would be a tough burden to carry and was presumably the reason they advised plaintiffs to 
accept settlement. Id.  
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settlement offer than the potential limit if the case went to a jury.
114
 
Ultimately, the attorneys moved to withdraw.
115
 While the appellate 
court noted that courts must ―be concerned about the quality of 
representation a client will receive from an attorney who has a 
fundamental disagreement with a client‘s objective, or who believes 
that the client‘s objective poses an unreasonable financial burden,‖ 
the court ultimately concluded ―the objective is for the client to 
choose‖116 and that it was the client‘s ―risk to take.‖117  
III. ANALYSIS 
The disconnect between the courts ruling on this issue raises 
concerns about the cohesiveness of the ABA ethical guidelines and 
their interpretation by the states.
118
 This presents a problem for the 
ethical attorney who wishes to withdraw but is subject to shifting and 
unclear standards.  
Augustson was heard in Texas in 1996, which adopted the 1983 
ABA Model Rules and comments in 1989.
119
 Thus, it is reasonable to 
believe that Augustson would be in accord with other jurisdictions 
that adopted the 1983 ABA Model Rules.
120
 However, as discussed 
below, that is not the case.  
 
 114. Id. The attorneys agreed to proceed to trial for the plaintiffs, but asked for mediation. 
At mediation, the arbitration panel also suggested to the plaintiffs that they settle, but the 
plaintiffs again refused. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 664. 
 117. Id. at 666. The court felt the attorneys could have continued to represent the clients 
without any ethical dilemmas and expressed concern that allowing attorneys to withdraw from 
―bad‖ cases and still obtain fee awards would encourage attorneys to drop nonlucrative cases. 
Id. at 664. 
 118. See Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera-Rios, 846 F.2d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1988). 
Although ―[t]his court has stated that, in acting upon a motion to disqualify or sanction an 
attorney, the district court should generally apply the ethical standard that is in effect at the time 
of the motion,‖ when the ethical standards are inconsistent and lack interpretive guidance, the 
results reached by the courts similarly are inconsistent.  
 119. ABA Model Rules Dates of Adoption, supra note 13. 
 120. Indeed, the Augustson court explicitly cited to the Texas Disciplinary Rules regarding 
the allocation of authority and withdrawal of representation: ―under the Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct ‗a lawyer shall abide by a client‘s decisions: (1) concerning the 
objectives and general methods of representation; [and] (2) whether to accept an offer of 
settlement of a matter, except as otherwise authorized by law.‘‖ 76 F.3d at 665–66 (quoting 
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT 1.02(a) (1991)).  
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Although Augustson was facially about granting attorney fees, the 
court noted that the case revolved around the issue of whether the 
attorney had just cause to withdraw.
121
 The court cited the Texas 
Disciplinary Rule provision on withdrawal of counsel,
122
 but it related 
only a couple of instances in which the attorney had good cause to 
withdraw: ―when the client has engaged in culpable conduct‖123 or 
―where continued representation is impossible due to forces beyond 
the attorney‘s control.‖124 Despite Texas having adopted substantially 
the same text as the ABA 1983 Model Rules, the court seemed to 
have limited the scope of the provision sua sponte.
125
 The court 
further construed ―just cause [as] ha[ving] been found where 
continued representation would violate ethical obligations of the 
attorney or where the attorney has insufficient funds to pursue 
litigation,‖ but tellingly, it did not seem to view the continued 
 
 121. The court noted that ―[t]he fundamental issue in this case, then, is whether Speiser 
Krause had just cause to withdraw sufficient under Texas law to receive compensation.‖ Id. at 
663. 
 122. Id. at 661 n.3. 
 123. Id. at 663. The court gives several examples: ―thus, for example, courts have found 
just cause where the client attempts to assert a fraudulent claim; fails to cooperate; refuses to 
pay for services; degrades or humiliates the attorney; or retains other counsel with whom the 
original attorney cannot work.‖ Id.  
 124. Id. Instead, the court cites several cases in which it found withdrawal justified: when 
the client was going to commit perjury (Staples v. McKnight, 763 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1988)); when there was a lack of resources (Int‘l Materials Corp. v. Sun Corp., 824 S.W.2d 
890, 893–96 (Mo. 1992) (en banc)); and, interestingly, when ethical obligations mandate 
withdrawal rather than merely permit it (so the attorney could recover fees and costs) (Estate of 
Falco, 233 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)). In Falco, the California court held that because 
an attorney‘s withdrawal due to a client‘s refusal to settle was not for good cause, the attorney 
could not recover his fees. Id. at 815–16. The Falco court agreed with the trial court that the 
attorney‘s withdrawal was not justified because the case did have merit, as evidenced by the 
settlement that the clients later obtained and by the vacillating statements of the attorneys as to 
the merits of the case. Id. at 814–16. Also, the appellate and trial courts stated that the primary 
reason that the attorney-client relationship had broken down was the ―mutual animosity‖ 
between the attorney and clients; thus, the clients‘ failure to cooperate with the attorney was 
equally the fault of the attorney. Id. at 817. However, the Falco court also stated that ―[w]e have 
not considered the consequences facing a client who refuses to accept a good faith settlement, 
including the possibility of a levy of sanctions,‖ Id. at 815 n.17, and expressly stated that ―[i]n 
deciding this appeal, we do not intend our opinion to apply to a related but different question 
regarding the circumstances in which an attorney has a right to withdraw from a case.‖ Id. at 
808. 
 125. Augustson, 76 F.3d at 663.  
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representation of the client as an ethical violation, not to mention a 
mandated one.
126
  
In contrast, Banks in 1998, and Jiricko in 1993, both Seventh 
Circuit cases from Illinois,
127
 were decided after Illinois adopted the 
1983 ABA Model Rules and comments in 1990.
128
 Its provisions on 
authority and termination of representation are substantially similar to 
the 2002 ABA Model Rules in that the client determines the scope of 
representation, but the attorney may withdraw if he considers the 
action imprudent.
129
  
The Banks and Jiricko cases allowed the attorney to withdraw, 
with the Banks court explicitly noting the ethical dilemma of the 
attorney if made to continue with the representation.
130
 Interestingly, 
despite the fact that Illinois had adopted the 1983 ABA Model Rules 
at the time the two cases were heard, the Banks and Jiricko courts 
instead relied on interpretive precedent of the issue from the 
Washington case, which had itself relied on the ABA Model Code.
131
 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Banks v. Andersen Consulting, LLP, No. 97-3110, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6555 (7th 
Cir. 1998); Jiricko v. Ill. Anesthesia, Ltd., Nos. 92-2613, 92-2682, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 
22030 (7th Cir. 1993).  
 The First Circuit also focused on common law to reach its conclusion in Citibank, N.A. v. 
Accounting Systems, No. 90-1145, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 14377 (1st Cir. Aug. 7, 1990). 
Citibank cited Washington and another First Circuit case, Culebras Enterprises Corp. v. Rivera-
Rios, 846 F.2d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1988) (discussing another ethical dilemma of the attorney as 
potential witness in the same case). In Citibank, an appeal heard from Puerto Rico in 1990, the 
court focused on the client‘s own culpability, and there was no mention of the Puerto Rico 
Canons of Professional Responsibility, which were promulgated in 1975. Citibank, 1990 U.S. 
LEXIS 14377.  
 128. See Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA, http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/a
lpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). Illinois recently updated 
its Rules of Professional Conduct in July 2009, effective January 2010. See ILL. RULES OF 
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2, available at http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/Art_ 
VIII/ArtVIII_NEW.htm#1.2. 
 129. It‘s meant to be a citation to the corresponding section in the 1983 ABA Model Rules. 
 130. See Banks, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6555, at *4. 
 131. Banks and Jiricko both cited Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081, 
1086 (7th Cir. 1982), in finding that the attorney was well within his right to withdraw after the 
client refused to listen to the attorney‘s advice. Banks, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6555 at *4; 
Jiricko, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 22030 at *5 (citing Washington in applying abuse-of-discretion 
standard to lower court‘s ruling on motion to withdraw). Washington cited to the Model Code, 
694 F.2d at 1088 (―[t]his is not to say, of course, that Attorney Toole would have acted 
improperly had he not sought permission to withdraw. An attorney is not compelled to 
withdraw if his or her client refuses proffered advice.‖) but mainly relied on district court cases 
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Although all three cases were supposedly under the guidance of its 
state‘s rules (which substantially tracked the 1983 ABA Model 
Rules), Banks, Jiricko and Augustson came to differing conclusions. 
This inconsistency mirrors the inconsistent way in which the states 
have adopted the ABA‘s model guidelines and consequently 
heightens the problem of unclear and shifting standards.  
The other circuit court case, Nehad, was decided in California, the 
only state that did not adopt the 2002 ABA Model Rules.
132
 
California‘s provisions on permissive withdrawal are substantially 
similar to the 1969 ABA Model Code.
133
 Due to the similarity 
between its black letter disciplinary rules and the 1969 ABA Model 
Code, it is again reasonable to expect that the Nehad case would be in 
accord with the other circuit court cases that were influenced by the 
1969 Model Code—the Washington and Whiting cases.134 Like 
above, however, the courts came to differing conclusions. 
 The Nehad court criticized the attorney‘s withdrawal because of 
the lack of timely notice to the client
135
 and stated that the attorney 
―may not burden the client‘s ability to make settlement decisions by 
structuring the representation agreement so as to allow the lawyer to 
withdraw, or to ratchet up the cost of representation, if the client 
 
and another circuit court case (though not directly on point) for authority. Note that 
Washington‘s use of the Model Code was in support of its argument that the attorney is not 
compelled to withdraw but may withdraw if the attorney so chooses. 
 132. See ABA Model Rules Dates of Adoption, supra note 13. 
 133. There is one important distinguishing characteristic of the California Rules in relation 
to the ABA Model Code: its discussion on permissive withdrawal does not address its 
permissive withdrawal subprovisions, but instead focuses on the return of fees, and on 
―reasonable steps‖ to avoid prejudice to the clients through the withdrawal. See CAL. RULES OF 
PROF‘L CONDUCT (2010), available at http://rules.calbar.ca.gov/Rules/RulesofProfessional 
Conduct/CurrentRules.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2011).  
 134. See Washington v. Sherwin Real Estate, Inc., 694 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1982); 
Whiting v. Lacara, 187 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 135. The court specifically notes: 
 Under California rules of professional conduct, his obligations were to give 
Rawshan timely notice that Speyer needed to withdraw, and to protect Rawshan by 
ensuring that he had the time and opportunity to secure new counsel. Under this rule, 
Speyer should have, at the least, informed the immigration court of his need to 
withdraw and asked, on Rawshan‘s behalf, for a continuance to allow Rawshan time to 
employ new counsel. That Speyer‘s omissions violated this rule is clear. 
535 F.3d at 962. 
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refuses an offer of settlement.‖136 While concern that withdrawal may 
materially affect a client‘s case and autonomy is reflected in both the 
California Rules and the ABA model guidelines, all three cases 
influenced by the 1969 Model Code (Nehad, Washington and 
Whiting) involved situations in which the attorney wished to 
withdraw shortly before or on the actual day of trial.
137
 If the concern 
was truly to protect the client against material adverse effects due to 
the attorney‘s withdrawal, then the outcomes in Washington and 
Whiting should be unique; however, as mentioned above, they are in 
accord with the majority of the other courts that have heard this issue. 
The court in Whiting, decided in New York in 1999, discussed 
New York‘s Model Code provisions on permissive withdrawal of 
counsel in effect at the time
138
 (New York did not adopt the 2002 
ABA Model Rules until 2008).
139
 The attorney in Whiting argued that 
he should be allowed to permissively withdraw based on three Model 
Code provisions,
140
 which the court stated provide ―guidance for the 
court as to what constitutes ‗good cause‘ to grant leave to withdraw 
as counsel.‖141 Similarly, Washington stated that ―[f]aced with his 
clients‘ rejection of his advice, Toole did not act improperly by 
 
 136. Id. at 971. 
 137. See Nehad v. Mukasey 535 F.3d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 2008); Washington, 694 F.2d at 
1085; Whiting, 187 F.3d at 319. 
 138. The New York Model Code‘s provision on permissive withdrawal of counsel mirrors 
the 1969 ABA Model Code in that it allows for permissive withdrawal of counsel if the client 
―[i]nsists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct which is 
contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the Disciplinary 
Rules.‖ See NEW YORK LAWYER‘S CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (2007), 
available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu/ForAttorneys/Professional Standards 
forAttorneys/LawyersCodeDec2807.pdf. Despite this particular subsection‘s applicability to 
matters not before a court, the ABA Model Code and New York Model Code also contain 
provisions that allow an attorney to withdraw if either the client insists on a meritless claim or if 
the client ―[b]y other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out 
employment effectively.‖ Id.; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF‘L RESPONSIBILITY (1969) 
(amended 1980), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/ mcpr.pdf. 
 139. See ABA Model Rules Dates of Adoption, supra note 13. 
 140. Specifically, the attorney argued that ―(i) Whiting [the client] ‗insists upon presenting 
a claim or defense that is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by good 
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,‘ Model Code DR 2-
110(C)(1)(a); (ii) Whiting‘s ‗conduct [has] rendered it unreasonably difficult for [Lacara] to 
carry out employment effectively,‘ DR 2-110(C)(1)(d); and (iii) Whiting has ‗deliberately 
disregarded an agreement or obligation to [Lacara] as to expenses or fees,‘ DR 2-110(C)(1)(f).‖ 
Whiting, 187 F.3d at 321. 
 141. Id. 
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seeking the court‘s permission to withdraw as ‗in private 
engagements counsel may withdraw if advice (even to settle) is not 
followed.‘‖142  
Even though these two cases were influenced by the 1969 Model 
Code, which explicitly excluded matters pending before a tribunal 
from the exceptions of the permissive withdrawal section based on 
disagreements with the client, the courts allowed the lawyer to 
withdraw in matters pending before them [sic], even though trial was 
imminent.
143
 Again, like Augustson, Nehad is at odds with the 
majority of the other cases, despite supposedly being guided by the 
same ethical principles. 
One fundamental reason for the disparity in circuit court (and 
district court
144
) opinions is the scattered nature with which each 
jurisdiction adopts (or not, as shown) the ABA model guidelines and 
comments.
145
 As one author notes, ―there is great variation among the 
versions adopted by the states.‖146 This variation creates different 
interpretations and applications of the ABA‘s model guidelines in 
each state and is at odds with the purpose of the ABA‘s model rules 
in the first instance
147
 as a cohesive, interdependent set of ethical 
guidelines.
148 
Another reason for the disparity is the lack of clear 
guidance from the ABA model guidelines themselves,
149
 as well as 
the inconsistent way in which courts accept and interpret what are 
supposedly the same ethical standards in effect in other 
jurisdictions.
150
 
Ultimately, it is troubling that in the cases that have withheld 
withdrawal of counsel the courts are essentially mandating an ethical 
 
 142. 694 F.2d at 1087–88 (citing Spero v. Abbott Labs., 396 F. Supp. 321, 323 (N.D. Ill. 
1975)). 
 143. See supra text accompanying notes 137–42. 
 144. See supra note 142. 
 145. See infra note 152. 
 146. Joy Miyasaki, Avoiding Ethical Dilemmas, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 
MATERIALS, ADVANCED ESTATE PLANNING TECHNIQUES, SL073 ALI-ABA 431, 435 (2006). 
 147. ―Uniformity of ethics rules among American jurisdictions was also a very significant, 
if not paramount, concern [in its decision to revise the 1969 ABA Code].‖ Pera, supra note 4, at 
639. 
 148. See ABA Goals, supra note 12. 
 149. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt [2] (2010) (providing unclear 
guidance as to the allocation of authority between lawyer and client). 
 150. See discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2012]  Refusing to Settle 413 
 
 
dilemma by requiring that attorneys continue representation.
151
 
Although the attorney presumably would and should not be 
responsible for any ethical violation stemming from their mandated 
representation, simply releasing them from sanctions does not 
effectively address the potential negative effects that mandated 
representation could have on the client and their case, in addition to 
the attorney‘s own mental state. 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Although states have been encouraged to adopt the ABA 
guidelines and comments in their entirety, not all states have done 
so.
152
 To that end, the ABA should cease its traditional practice of 
passive encouragement and create an incentive program to induce 
states to adopt the complete guidelines.
153
 For example, the ABA 
 
 151. For example, if the attorney is forced to continue representation, can an attorney really 
diligently represent a client with whom she has a fundamental disagreement? See generally 
MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.3, available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_3_dilige
nce.html. Also, what if the client‘s case can be considered meritless? See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 3.1. 
 152. In particular, not all states that have adopted the revised ABA Model Rules have 
adopted the comments that accompany the rules. See CPR POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COMM., 
AM. BAR ASS‘N., STATE ADOPTION OF COMMENTS TO MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT, available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments 
.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2011). 
 153. Pera states that: 
 Since the completion of its revisions to the Model Rules, the ABA has attempted to 
support work in the various jurisdictions to evaluate and revise their ethics rules, 
especially through its Joint Committee on Lawyer Regulation, by providing material, 
speakers, and other assistance to the groups doing this work. While the ABA 
consciously ceases its efforts short of evangelization in favor of the adoption of the 
Model Rules, and generally attempts to avoid criticism of existing or proposed rules 
that depart from the Model Rules as being somehow inferior, the Joint Committee and 
the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility have made various outreach efforts to 
promote the adoption of the revised ABA Model Rules. 
Pera, supra note 4, at 642. The author later elaborates on the ABA‘s attempt to persuade the 
states to adopt the Model Rules:  
 Commentators on earlier drafts of this article pointed out to me that the ABA does 
not specifically employ a team of ―Model Rule evangelists‖ (my term, not theirs) to 
tour the country to convince state supreme courts and drafting committees that the 
ABA rules are best and should be adopted. True enough. Still, the ABA Joint 
Committee on Lawyer Regulation does provide much support and assistance, all of a 
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could offer enhanced free continuing legal education courses to the 
states that have adopted the ABA model guidelines in their entirety, 
as well as other free and comprehensive educational and practical 
resources that would assist the states in educating their attorneys 
about the ABA‘s (and their individual) ethical expectations.154 This 
would create uniformity of interpretation among the states and courts, 
which would then resolve the tension between the disagreeing 
attorney and client, as the line between permissible and 
impermissible withdrawal of representation because of a conflict 
arising from the allocation of authority between the client and the 
attorney would be made clearer. 
The form of ABA‘s guidelines over the years has morphed from a 
detailed exposition of important ethical considerations into an 
emphasis on the black letter rule.
155
 The absence of clear comments 
as to how the provisions on the allocation of authority between the 
attorney and client and when the attorney can permissively withdraw 
contribute to the confusion within the courts.
156
 Additionally, the 
changing models of guidelines promulgated over the years have cut 
out the vital ethical discussion inherent in the rules, while still failing 
to provide practical guidance to the attorney.
157
  
 
highly substantive nature, to drafting committees and courts around the country 
considering adopting ABA rules.  
Id. at 650. 
 154. The ABA currently offers CLE courses to its members, with some at reduced prices. 
Continuing Legal Education & Training, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/membership/ 
benefits_of_membership/professional_development/cle_training.html (last visited Oct. 23, 
2011). 
 155. See Meserve, supra note 51 (―The first format, consisting of blackletter Rules and 
accompanying Comments in the so-called restatement format, was submitted with the 
Commission‘s recommendation that it be adopted. The alternative format was patterned after 
the Model Code and consisted of Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules.‖).  
 156. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt 2 (2010). 
 157. The need for a clear comment is not peculiar to these two provisions. Indeed, Nancy 
Moore states that there are many provisions that are rarely ―so clear and concise that there can 
be no excuse for their violation.‖ Nancy J. Moore, The Evolving Role of Ethics Codes, in A 
CENTURY OF LEGAL ETHICS: TRIAL LAWYERS AND THE ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS 223, 223 (Lawrence J. Fox et al. eds., 2009). The author continues with the recognition 
that simple, clear ethics provisions may be desirable, but that the ―twenty-first century lawyer 
ethics codes are by necessity complex.‖ Id. at 226. However, the author recognizes that 
 [i]f our disciplinary codes are to continue to serve the public interest, they must be 
understandable not only to lawyers but to  members of the public as well. The 
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To resolve this issue, the ABA should create a hybrid, 
comprehensive model guideline that contains the black letter rule, 
ethical considerations that accompany each rule, interpretive 
commentary, and practice pointers with hypothetical scenarios. As 
states look to the ABA guidelines for guidance on how to draft their 
own ethical rules,
158
 clearer rules, coupled with an incentive program 
to encourage states to adopt these rules in their entirety, would 
jumpstart consistency within the courts. 
In addition, providing clear and detailed guidelines will enable 
attorneys to monitor their own representation and practice, which 
would prevent these troublesome suits in the first place.
159
 Although 
attorneys should make clear and reasonable predictions as to the 
outcomes of a case from the very beginning of representation, clearer 
guidelines would benefit and assist those attorneys who unexpectedly 
find themselves in a sticky situation with their client.  
CONCLUSION 
For the practicing attorney, navigating through the ethics rules is 
made much more difficult by the lack of consistent and 
comprehensive explanatory ethical guidelines. Although attorneys are 
directed by their professional rules of conduct to focus on the client‘s 
wishes, practical experience and professional knowledge may point 
to a different path in the course of representation. Also, with the 
current system of scattered and inconsistent guidelines from the ABA 
and the states, attorneys face a potential ethical conflict with every 
new client—not only with the allocation of authority and withdrawal, 
but also with every aspect of the attorney-client relationship.  
 
challenge for future code drafters is to find the right balance of specificity that will 
satisfy the needs of a complex world, while simultaneously achieving the generality 
and clarity that the public needs . . . .  
Id.  
 158. See MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT pmbl. (2010), available at http://www. 
americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_
conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_preamble_scope.html. 
 159. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF‘L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt 1. 
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In order to provide a uniform and consistent model in keeping 
with the ABA‘s goals, change is necessary.160 A new hybrid 
regulation model by the ABA, along with prompt, uniform adoption 
by the states of the complete package of both the model provisions 
and comments, will provide consistent and predictable guidelines for 
an attorney venturing too close to the edge of an ethical cliff.  
 
 160. See ABA Goals, supra note 12.  
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